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Does mid-season change of coach improve team performance? Evidence from the 




This research has advanced in the understanding of the effect of hiring new coaches on 
performance of NBA teams, when change is achieved in the middle of the season. 
Changing a coach is an important managerial decision which does not guarantee 
improvement of results in the short term, i.e. in the same season. Using an easily 
understandable procedure based on comparison of proportions in a finite population 
approach framework, we show that only about 15% of new coaches outperformed in a 
significantly way their predecessors. In order to maximize the probability of success, 
highly experienced coaches, with a long career as former NBA players should be 
signed. In addition, change should be made before season advances. These three factors 
slightly contribute to increase the probability of success, being the most important 
variable the winning percentage of the team at the moment of change. Therefore, worse 
teams are more probable to be successful than better teams when a change is made. 
Finally, implications and limitations are discussed. 
 
Keywords: Changing a coach, team performance, basketball, decision making in sports 
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Does mid-season change of coach improve team performance? Evidence from the 
history of the NBA 
 
One of the most important management dilemmas for owners and general 
managers of sports teams is about changing a coach when results are not as good as 
expected within a season. Numerous studies have addressed this topic in football/soccer 
(e.g. Barros, Frick & Passos, 2009; Bruinshoofd & ter Weel, 2003; Frick, Pestana & 
Prinz, 2010; Koning, 2003; González-Gómez, Picazo-Tadeo & García-Rubio, 2011; 
Salomo, Teichmann & Albrechts, 2000; Tena & Forrest, 2007; Van Dalen, 1994). In 
other sports, this topic has been also a matter of subject, but has attracted lesser 
attention: American football (Brown, 1982; McTeer, White & Persad, 1995), baseball 
(Gamson & Scotch, 1964; McTeer, White & Persad, 1995; Scully, 1995), hockey 
(McTeer, White & Persad, 1995) or basketball (Fizel & D’Itri, 1999; Giambatista, 2004; 
McTeer, White & Persad, 1995; Scully, 1995). Results of these studies are contradictory 
(see Koning, 2003, and González-Gómez, Picazo-Tadeo & García-Rubio, 2011). One of 
the reasons of these disparate findings is the heterogeneous nature of data (disparate 
sports, seasons, competitions…), and the distinct assumptions, models and statistical 
tools used to analyse such data. 
 
Changing a coach is an important managerial decision because it has several 
consequences for teams: (1) short-term financial costs: owners have to compensate the 
coach who has been dismissed and to pay to the new hired coach1
                                                 
1 For example, Pistons paid about $6 million dollars to Larry Brown in 2005 after firing him 
(
; (2) team 
performance uncertainty: there are inconsistent results about if changing a coach 
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-13896726.html). In 2008, Kings paid three head coaching salaries 
that season to Natt, Theus and Musselman (http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/28239643) 
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improves, declines or maintains the current performance; then it is highly complicated 
to make a reliable prediction about the success of the potential change.  
 
Regarding the first point, salaries of NBA coaches are the highest for North 
American professional sports (Van Ripper, 2010). The average NBA coaching salary 
grew from $2.73 million in 1998 to $3.81 million in 20072
 
, being about $3.4 million in 
2010 (García, 2010). It is true that the average player salary is $5.9 million, meaning the 
majority of coaches make less than those they're paid to lead (García, 2010), but this 
does not mean that these quantities paid to coaches are without importance for team 
budgets. 
Regarding the second point, as Frick, Pestana and Prinz (2010) explains3
 
, some 
theories have been used to analyze either CEO or head coach turnover: ‘‘common sense 
theory”, ‘‘vicious circle theory” and, ‘‘ritual scapegoating theory” Common sense 
theory is based on the assumption that a new CEO or a new head coach will be hired if 
he has the required expertise and experience to increase the performance of the firm or 
the team. Therefore, a new head coach can be instrumental in breaking organizational 
inertia and then in initiating strategic change. Vicious circle theory assumes the 
opposite; consequently, successions are likely to have a disruptive effect on the team in 
terms of increasing instability and ambiguity and will thus lead to an even poorer 
performance. At last, ritual scapegoating theory suggests that there is no relationship 
between succession and performance and that succession events just serve as signals to 
stakeholders that required organizational change is under way.  
                                                 
2 See http://www.gastongazette.com/sports/million-3839-salary-year.html 
3 See also Fizel and D’itri (1999) 
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Therefore, both theory and practice do not provide a clear answer to the 
question: changing a coach in the middle of a season improves team performance? In 
addition, in professional basketball, there is a lack of studies regarding this topic. As 
stated previously, the studies of McTeer, White & Persad (1995), Scully (1995), Fizel 
and D’Itri (1999) and Giambatista (2004) are the most relevant. However, McTeer, 
White & Persad (1995) imposed several restrictions to the characteristics of changes to 
be included in the sample, obtaining a very small number of cases (22) to analyse. With 
regard to Scully (1995), he focused his research about changes of coaches among 
consecutive seasons, and not within a season. On the other hand, in the research of Fizel 
and D’itri (1999) most of the changes were end of season with relatively few mid-
season changes.  When a mid-season change occurred, the performance of the fired 
coach was then compared to his permanent not temporary successor. Regarding 
Giambatista’s (2004) study, he mainly focused on the analysis of life-cycle of coaches 
in the NBA, using all the changes of coaches occurred in the NBA till the 2001-02 
season. Results of this study indicated that midseason hires were associated with a sharp 
performance decline; team performance following an off-season hire was higher than 
performance following a midseason hire. Therefore, Giambatista (2004) did not 
explicitly compare the performance of hired coaches against fired coaches within the 
same season. 
 
In this research, we analyse all mid-season coaches changes in the history of the 
NBA, from the first change (1949-50 season), to the latter (2009-10 season). We 
statistically compare the winning percentage of each team when a coach is replaced4
                                                 
4 We consider all changes of head coaches, regardless of these changes were voluntary (resigned coaches) 
personal or not (fired coaches). 
, 
with the winning percentage got by the same teams managed by new coaches, in order 
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to obtain a reliable test considering performance achieved in a sample of the whole 
games of a season. In addition we test a model in order to explain the successes cases, 
i.e. when a new coach got statistically better results than the coach he replaced. To our 
knowledge, this is one of the few studies in sports that reviews all the mid-season 
changes of coaches in a professional league, because other studies have focused only in 
a specific period of time. For example: Van Dalen (1995), 1 season; Tena and Forrest 
(2007), 3 seasons; Koning (2003), 4 seasons; Fizel and D’Itri (1999), 8 seasons; 
González-Gómez, Picazo-Tadeo and García-Rubio (2011), 8 seasons; Salomo, 
Teichmann and Albrechts (2000), 19 seasons; Frick, Pestana and Prinz (2010), 22 
seasons. We review all of the 61 seasons of the NBA league. It is true that Horowitz 
(1994) made a similar extensive review in baseball (from 1903 to 1992), but he 
aggregated both between and within season changes, and only provided results of 
performance comparisons for a random sample of 25 teams. In addition, Giambatista 
(2004) and McTeer, White & Persad (1995) made also an akin review for the NBA 
league, from the beginning of the competition to the 2001-02 season and 1988-89 
season, respectively. However, the former study mainly focused of life cycle of coaches, 
and the second study included a very small number of cases to analyse.  
 
Results from our research show that changing a coach only improves 
performance in about 15% of cases, being the neutral effect prevalent in the majority of 
cases (about 75%). In addition, the probability of success (i.e. the probability of a new 
coach improves performance), increases with his experience and expertise (defined by 
the number of games managed and the number of wins got till the moment of change) 
and also with his experience as a former NBA player (defined by the number of season 
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played), but it inversely related to the winning percentage of a team at the moment of 
change, and the difference between games played by old and new coaches. 
 
Therefore, the unique contribution of this research to sport management 
literature is threefold: Firstly, we propose a simple form to compare performance of new 
coaches with performance of replaced coaches, based on principles of basic probability, 
in order to study the success of decisions made by owners and general managers. This 
method may be easily understood and implemented for sport managers; Secondly, we 
make the most extensive review of changes of coaches in basketball, analysing all the 
mid-season changes occurred in the history of the NBA, providing a full description of 
these changes. And thirdly, we identify factors influencing the probability of success, 
providing practical implications for decision makers about the effect of such variables in 
the change of the probability of success. 
 
Method 
Data and measures 
We collected data from www.basketball-reference.com, the major source of 
basketball data available at the present time. We considered all mid-season changes of 
coaches from the first NBA season (1949-50) to the last (2009-10). We also registered 
other measures: (1) experience and expertise of new coaches (winning percentage and 
games managed in the league at that moment, and winning percentage and games 
managed in the league in their whole career). In addition we considered data for coaches 




 per 48 minutes, if they were all-star players and if they are Hall of Fame 
players); (2) number of games a team played at the moment of change, at the end of the 
season, and played after new coaches were signed; (3) winning percentage of teams at 
the moment of change, at the end of the season, and obtained by new coaches. 
Procedure to compare performance 
We compared the winning percentage got by teams trained by old coaches with 
the winning percentage obtained by teams trained by new coaches. We used the finite 
population approach of the binomial distribution for comparing two proportions (see 
Levy and Lemeshow, 1999). As the winning percentage is a variable ranged from 0 to 
1, we considered the value of such variable in a specific moment of the season as p , 
which is an estimate of P , i.e. the winning percentage of the team at the end of the 
season, after playing N  games. Recall that the value of N depends of the season, and 
ranges from 64 of the 1950/51 season to 82 at the current time.   
 
Taking basic principles of statistical inference, to the extent that the n games 
played by a NBA franchise when a coach left the team approximates N , then the 
imprecision of p  decreases, but p  will always has an associated confidence interval 
when n N<  and 0 1p< <  Therefore, if we denote 1p  the winning percentage obtained by 
a coach in 1n games, and 2p the winning percentage obtained by his substitute in 
2n games, then we may make a test for the difference of proportions. Therefore, under 
the null hypothesis of equally of population parameters 1 2P P= , we may compute an 
approximate 95% confidence interval for the difference of proportions: 
                                                 
5 Winshares is a measure of productivity achieved by players, which considers offensive and defensive 
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, and similarly for 22S .  
 
Therefore, if a computed confidence interval contains zero, then we can not 
reject the hypothesis of equality of proportions, i.e. we can not consider that both 
winning percentages differ. In addition, the positive or negative value of both extremes 
of a confidence interval favours the alternative hypothesis of difference in proportions, 
which means that a replaced coach got significantly better results, or a new coach 
obtained significantly better performance, respectively.  
 
This simplistic method has the advantage of consider uncertainty in the value of 
the winning percentage of teams. When a coach only manages a portion of all of the 
possible games of a season, it is highly desirable to depict the winning percentage 
obtained using an interval estimation, because we are not sure about if this punctual 
value at the moment of change reflects without error the strength of the team. This fact 
has not been addressed in past research on basketball, such as Fidel and D’itri (1999), 
Giambatista (2004) or McTeer, White and Persad (1995). However, we consider this 
issue as crucial for making comparisons among performance of different coaches when 
analysing mid-season changes, because we are comparing two samples of games from 
two hypothetical populations. Therefore, a statistical test is necessary to ascertain 
weather both populations are the same or not, i.e. if both winning percentages differs or 
are statistically the same. In addition, as the criteria to compare winning percentages is 
based on a probabilistic perspective, we believe that outperforms the procedure 
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achieved by McTeer, White and Persad (1995), authors who subjectively considered 11 
games played as a cut-off value for including cases in their study. 
 
Statistical model 
Once obtained which coaches improved team performance we were interested in 
explaining such success. We created a new dichotomous variable iy  for all the i  cases, 
being 0 “no success” (including the cases of no difference in performance and better 
performance of old coaches), and 1 “success” (better performance of new coaches). In 
addition, in order to explain such variation in performance, we identified variables 
which could influence the probability of success. Following the principles of General 










= + + − 
∑ , where kiX was a set of predictors, 0β and kβ were the 
coefficients to be estimated, and e was a random error with zero mean which was 
uncorrelated with predictors.  
 
We considered the following predictors: (1) the experience/expertise6
1X
 of new 
coaches, reflected in games played in the NBA and the number of wins obtained,  ; 
(2) the experience/ expertise of new coaches as former NBA players 2X ; (3) the 
winning percentage of teams at the time of change, 3X ; (4) the difference between the 
percentage of games played in a season between a new and an old coach, 4X ; (5) the 
NBA trajectory of new coaches in the next years, 5X . This latter variable should not be 
included in predictive models because, obviously, it is not available at the moment of 
                                                 
6 We speak about experience, expertise or ability of coaches in a similar way. We understand that may be 
considered different concepts for some authors (e.g. Giambatista, 2004), but we only want to reflect the 
curriculum vitae of coaches defined by games managed and wins obtained, i.e. the a priori potential or 
quality of hired coaches. 
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change, but it must be included in the exploration of explaining models, because it 
might improve the explained variance of the dependent variable. 
 
Regarding 1X , Salomo, Teichmann and Albrechts (2000), and Giambatista 
(2004) considered this variable as a good proxy for valuating coaches abilities. In 
addition, Barros, Frick and Passos (2009) found that the probability of being dismissed 
was negatively affected by head coaches’ experience and their winning percentage. We 




 (Schmueli, Patel & Bruce, 2007) in order to transform the distribution of the 
number of games played by a coach into a S-shaped curve. In this case 1A  refers to the 
number of NBA games played by a coach till the moment of signing with the new team, 
and λ is a parameter to adjust the curve to the desired rank of values. We hypothesised 
that this form of curve reflects the effect of experience on performance, Therefore, 
increasing the number of games played yield a small effect of performance in the first 
steps of a coach career and when a coach has played a great amount of games.  
 
In order to create an easily interpretable index after the sigmoid transformation, 
we made the following: First, we considered the distribution of the number of games 
played by all the 203 coaches. This was a highly asymmetrical distribution with a high 
amount of zeros (new coaches without any previous experience in the NBA). Taking the 
form of this distribution, we computed its median (209 games), and then the deviation 
of each value from that median. These values ranged from -209 (rookie coaches) to 
2197 of the Hall of Famer Lenny Wilkens. Second, we calibrated the sigmoid function 
using the λ parameter, in order to obtain a normalized [0,1] function. This calibration 
process yielded a 1/ 75λ = . Figure 1 shows the final curve. We strongly believed that 
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this S-shaped curve was a better model for characterizing coaching experience, instead 
of other forms of learning gains, such as the natural logarithm transformation achieved 
by Giambatista (2004). Logarithm yields a curve with increased diminishing returns to 
the extent that experience grows. However, we think that in the first steps of NBA 
coaches career, gains of learning should be modelled using this type of exponential 
growth. 
 
--- Figure 1 about here --- 
 
We achieved exactly the same procedure with the number of wins got by 
coaches, because obviously it is not the same to play many games and lose the majority 
of them than to play many games winning a great percentage of them. Giambatista 
(2004) also used wins got by coaches, although with the natural logarithm 
transformation. We hypothesized that “winners” coaches should have a greater 
experience index (i.e. potential) than “losers”. Median of the distribution was 84.5, and 
deviation from median ranged from -84.5 (rookie coaches) to 1207 of Lenny Wilkens. 
In this case, the calibration process yielded a 1/ 20λ = . Considering that correlation 
between both measures of coaches experience (once transformed in a normalized form) 
was about 0.98, and in order to avoid multicollineality problems, we aggregated both 
measures to finally get an index of coach experience ranged in a [0,2] interval.  
 
An important decision regarding the nature of this variable was about 
considering experience in the BAA (Basketball Association of America) and ABA 
(American Basketball Association) leagues. BAA league was a professional basketball 
league founded in 1946 and, together with ABL (American Basketball League) and 
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NBL (National Basketball League), contributed to the expansion and promotion of 
basketball before NBA was created. Moreover, NBA was created from a merge of BAA 
and ABL. There are only BAA data available (from 1946/47 to 1948/49 seasons), so we 
decided to include the experience of coaches who trained BAA teams in the same form 
as if they had trained NBA teams. However, we do not have data regarding experience 
of coaches in the other professional leagues, such as NBL and ABL. 
 
A similar problem appeared with the ABA league, a professional competition 
founded in 1967. This league challenged the hegemony of NBA during several years, 
and finally merged with NBA in 1976. Four ABA teams joined to NBA, so we also 
decided to include the experience of coaches who trained ABA teams in the same way 
of NBA teams. 
 
Regarding 2X , Goodall, Kahn and Oswald (2010) found that former star players 
make the best coaches. In addition, this expert knowledge effect is large. Therefore, we 
hypothesized that the experience of coaches as former players increased the probability 
of success. Goodall, Kahn and Oswald (2010) used several measures of experience. 
Following these authors, we also used measures such as the number of season played, if 
the player was All-Star, and if the player is member of the Hall of Fame. In addition, 
and as a novelty, we registered information regarding number of minutes played and 
winshares, because we thought that these variable could measure the quality of 
experience of players in a more reliable way. Note that players could play many NBA 
seasons but with a marginal presence in the roster rotation, so minutes played and a 
productivity index such as winshares could overcome this limitation. 
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We, thus, created three indicators for measuring 2X . The first one was an ordered 
variable ranged from 0 to 3, being the codification as follows: “0” coaches without 
NBA experience as players; “1”, coaches with NBA experience; “2” coaches who had 
been All-Star as players; and “3”, coaches pertaining to the Hall of Fame as players. 
The second variable was the number of seasons played as players. And the third 
variable was a combination of number of minutes played and the winshares per 48 
minutes achieved. As we thought S-shaped curve was the best way to characterize 
ability and performance variables, then we transformed the second and third variable 
using the procedure previously depicted for 1X . However, we also tested the alternative 
specification of consider the first two variables in the original scales, as Goodall, Kahn 
and Oswald (2010) did. Therefore, we ran several model using these three indicators, in 
order to choose the indicator which the best explanatory power. 
 
Regarding 3X , we hypothesized that the winning percentage of a team at the 
time of change would be negatively associated with coach performance improvement, 
i.e. new coach success. The rationale of this simple reasoning is straightforward: it will 
be easier to outperform a very bad winning percentage than a good winning percentage. 
Obviously, this association would be moderated for the intrinsic quality of each team 
considered, because it would be easier for coaches of good teams to outperform a very 
bad winning percentage than for coaches of bad teams. However, as the proxy variable 
for valuating quality of teams is the winning percentage at the end of the season, we did 
not consider a good decision to use it as predictor, because the dependent variable is 
precisely measuring change in quality of teams due to the new coach effect. 
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Regarding 4X , the difference between the percentage of games played in a 
season between a new and a replaced coach, this variable should be included in order to 
study if the probability of success increases with the parity of games played by replaced 
and new coaches. To the extent that 1n approximates 2n  power of the test would 
increase, considering constant the remaining factors, so it would be more probable to 
obtain significant results. In addition, this variable could provide information regarding 
a “time effect”, i.e. if managing more games improves performance. 
 
Finally, regarding 5X , the NBA trajectory of new coaches in their whole career 
could serve as an additional information to calibrate the quality of coaches. A coach 
with a prominent NBA career after being signed by a team, could be indicative of the 
quality of this coach at the moment of change. It is certain that this reasoning may be 
criticized, because a coach could improve his potential to the extent that he increases his 
experience, so we will only explore the behaviour of this variable in the model. We built 
this variable using exactly the same procedure of 1X , being anchored in a [0,2] interval. 
Note that correlation between 1X  and 5X was 0.55. Although this can be considered a 
high correlation, it is also true that indicates that there is an important portion of 
uncommon variance between both variables.  
 
Omitted variables 
With regard to model specification, two important issues were not addressed: the 
home/away calendar and the strength of schedule. Both elements have been considered 
important to study the effect of firing a coach on team performance (Koning, 2003), 
because of the effect of home advantage (see Winston, 2009) and the effect of disparate 
winning percentages on the probability of win (see Huang, Weng & Lin, 2006).  
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However, there are important difficulties to consider these factors in our study. 
The main limitation arises from the practical impossibility to collect data about the 
winning percentage of each team playing against all of the cases we have considered 
during 61 years of competition. Note that it would be necessary to “manually” register 
the winning percentage of rivals and if the game was played at home or away for the 
approximately 6842 games played by teams before changing a coach, and the 
approximately 7939 games played by the same teams after signing a new coach, i.e. a 
total of 14781 games7
 
. In addition, there is interaction between the home/away variable 
and the winning percentage variable, so it had not been feasible to aggregate the 
winning percentage of teams played against the focused team that changed a coach in a 
season (this fact would have facilitated the task), because the home/away advantage acts 
in a different form for teams having better performance. As Koning (2003) claimed, the 
effect of home advantage variable varies between teams. We made a small analysis in 
order to ascertain this in basketball. We got data from three seasons (from 2006/07 to 
2008/09), and computed the number of total wins for each team and the percentage of 
home wins. The mean percentage of home wins was 0.61, indicating the influence of 
this factor for winning a game (11 points above the neutral value of 0.5). However, the 
distribution of values ranged from 0.46 to 0.73 in the 90 cases considered. Therefore we 
correlated team wins with the percentage of home wins and we found a negative 
correlation of -0.33. This clearly indicated that, in the NBA, worse teams are relatively 
stronger in home than better teams.  
Acknowledging the limitation of not counting with the home/away variable and 
the strength of schedule, we made two simulations in order to study the possible bias in 
                                                 
7 We say approximately because some games were played in a neutral venue. From 1950 to 1974, about 
1461 games (13.77%) were played in a neutral court (Justin Kubatko from www.basketball-
reference.com, personal communication).  
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our results derived from omitting these variables.  Firstly, we analysed the effect of the 
disparity of calendar on the duality of home/away wins. Recall that all teams in the 
NBA play the same number of games at home vs. away (currently, 41 games). We used 
data base of team results of 2006/07, 2007/08 and 2008/09 seasons, downloaded from 
www.nbastuffer.com8
 
. We registered the number of home and away games for each 
team and we ordered data in function of each team schedule. To achieve simulations, we 
considered only data from game number 15 to game number 67, which encompasses 
from about 18 to 82% of season games, because almost of 90% of changes of coaches in 
the history of NBA occurred within this interval of percentages. We compared the 
number of home games with the number of expected home games in each partition that 
would be necessary to maintain the parity of home vs. away games. Note that we 
considered the number of home games in 54 different partitions (from 15 to 67 games). 
Then we computed the difference between the observed and the expected number of 
home games for the 30 teams, for the 3 seasons and for the 54 disparate partitions 
(30x3x54=4860 cases). Results are showed in Figure 2. The shaded area represents data 
between the percentiles 5 and 95. Therefore, 90% of data falls under approximately -3 
and 3 home games of difference. It is true that there are cases within the 0-5 and 95-100 
percentiles where this difference becomes about 6 games (see dashed line), but we may 
say, with a lot of prudency, that the disparity of calendar do not yield an ostensible 
difference in home vs. away parity, in particular when data move away from the middle 
of distribution.  
---Figure 2 about here--- 
 
                                                 
8 This database is a user friendly Excel resource, which allows to program different procedures to analyse 
the home/field advantage and the strength of schedule. Unfortunately, data are only available from the 
2006/07 season.  
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Secondly, and using the same data base of three NBA regular season games, we 
analysed differences in strength of schedule in the same 54 partitions. For example, for 
the 15 games partition, we compared the mean of opponents winning percentage at the 
end of the season (from game 1 to game 15), with the mean of opponents winning 
percentage at the end of the season for the 67 remaining games (from game 16 to game 
82). In order to avoid scale problems and to count with dispersion of data, we also 
achieve the same analysis using the coefficient of variation, i.e. the standard deviation 
divided by the mean. Results are showed in Figure 3. The shaded area represents data 
between the percentiles 5 and 95. Therefore, 90% of data falls under approximately (-
0.05 and 0.05) units of difference. Considering the winning percentage is a [0,1] 
variable, this represent only between -5% and 5% of variation. It is true that this 
difference is a little higher for coefficient of variation (dashed line), which indicates that 
there is also a difference in the dispersion of distributions (some teams play with more 
homogeneous rivals than others, with regard to the quality of teams). Contrary to the 
Figure 2, differences become larger in the tails of the graphic. 
 
---Figure 3 about here--- 
 
In sum, acknowledging the shortcoming of omitting variables such as home field 
advantage and strength of schedule, these simulations show that the potential omitted 
information should no have an important effect on the probability of success. The lack 
of an available database to facilitate the registration of this great amount of data has 
been a barrier impossible to overcome. However, after viewing these simulations, we 
are convinced our results are still robust and they are not importantly biased. 
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Interpretation and generalization of results 
A final commentary regarding our methodology deserves to be highlighted. We 
have studied all the population of NBA changes within a season in the history of the 
league. There is no sample of changes, consequently, from a theoretical viewpoint, there 
is no inference from the sample to the hypothetical population. Therefore, we do not 
need statistical tests to analyse results9
 
. However, this philosophy of analysis excludes 
any potential extension of results to other populations, such as other leagues, for 
example. In addition, this excludes any predictive inference about future changes in the 
NBA. Therefore, we also report statistical tests and confidence intervals in the analysis 
made with all the population of coaches. Extension to a hypothetical infinite population 
of coaches’ changes would require the assumptions of: (1) the 203 changes of coaches 
analysed are a random sample of a population of changes in all the leagues of the world; 
(2) future conditions in the NBA will be the same (there will be no new systematic 
factors affecting change). The first assumption would be required to respond to the 
question: Changing a coach within a season improves team performance in basketball 
(without restriction to the NBA)? And the second assumption would be necessary to 
make predictions. Taking into account the heterogeneity of basketball leagues in the 
world, placed in different countries, with disparate sport cultures and systems of 
competition, the first assumption seems less plausible than the second. Therefore, we 
should be very cautious for the generalization of results. 
 
                                                 
9 We are referring here to the inferential procedure from a sample of changes to the population of 
changes. We considered the population of changes, because we studied all the mid-season changes 
occurred in the history of the league.  Therefore, we did not need statistical inference for explaining the 
history of NBA changes of coaches. Note that this is a different case from the procedure to compare the 
performance of coaches, depicted previously as a statistical comparison between two proportions. In this 





A total of 203 changes occurred in the 61 years of history of the NBA (a mean of 
3.32 changes by year). Table 1 shows the distribution of changes. As there is 
heterogeneity in the games played by teams, we normalised the changes per 1230 
games, because this is the number of games played in the NBA each season since 
2004/05. There is high dispersion in the distribution of changes, but we found a little 
pattern of association between coach changes and time, because Pearson correlation was 
-0.12. Therefore there is a small trend of diminishing instability with time.  
 
--- Table 1 about here --- 
 
A total of 158 different coaches were signed. Table 2 shows all the coaches 
signed and the number of times they were contracted within a season. One hundred and 
twenty-one of these 158 coaches did not manage any NBA team before, although 6 
coaches trained only BAA or ABA teams, and not NBA teams before they were signed. 
This represents about 76.6% of the coaches and about 59.6% of all the changes made.  
 
--- Table 2 about here --- 
 
Regarding when coaches were replaced, we used the percentage of games played 
in a season instead of the raw number of games played because of the diversity of 
seasons considered. Mean was 0.42 and median was 0.41. Therefore the distribution 
was symmetrical, being 0.23 the first quartile and 0.57 the third. Data ranged from 
0.01% (when Buffalo Braves replaced Dolph Shayes by Johnny McCarthy in 1971 after 
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the first game) to 0.96% (when Atlanta Hawks replaced Hubie Brown and signed Mike 
Fratello in 1981 for playing the three last games of the season). Thirty six of these new 
coaches did not finish the season either, so they also were replaced within the same 
season. Twenty-two of them could be considered as “temporary coaches” because they 
managed four games or less, waiting for the arrival of the coach really desired by team 
owners. 
 
In Table 3 we show the comparison of performance of the teams managed by the 
signed coaches compared with the same teams managed by replaced coaches. Results 
are derived from the use of the binomial comparison, previously explained. 
 
--- Table 3 about here --- 
 
We may say that the vast majority of changes (3 of 4 considering only valid 
cases) did not significantly influence performance. However, among the 48 significant 
changes, almost 2 of 3 of these changes improved team performance. Therefore, only 
about a 15% of coach changes yielded the desired effect. If we take now an inferential 
approach, we need a statistical test. Using chi-square, we find significant results: 
χ2=151.1 (df.=2); p=0.000, and with the Phi statistic (Grissom and Kim, 2005), we may 
provide an effect size index: Phi=0.89, which can be considered a very high effect. 
These results reject the hypothesis of equal effect of the three possible outcomes 
(neutral, worse or better performance). Therefore, it seems clear the prevalence of the 
neutral effect. We can also modify the analysis creating only two possible outcomes: 
neutral+worse vs. better, then χ2=90.75 (df.=1); p=0.000; Phi=0.68, which it is also a 
very noticeable effect size.  
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As we show in Table 4, the majority of coaches who got better performance 
continued the following season in their respective teams (76.67%), but some of them 
were fired having outperformed the previous coaches (20.00%).  
 
--- Table 4 about here--- 
 
We may also simulate the estimate of the percentage of successful coaches in the 
following years under the assumption of equality of conditions. Table 5 shows these 
simulations. We used the binomial estimation and the associated 95% confidence 
interval. Considering that the mean of replacements is 3.32 per year, in the following 10 
years it seems that the estimation is very accurate. Obviously, reliability of estimate 
decreases over time. 
 
--- Table 5 about here--- 
 
Once obtained global results about the effect of firing a coach within a season, 
we were interested to test a model in order to explain success, i.e. which factors increase 
or decrease the probability of improving performance. We applied the philosophy of 
analysis of Mayo (1996) and Spanos (2007; 2010), in order to achieve an inductive 
process of learning from data, using a statistical model and testing its assumptions.The 
idea behind this approach is that to secure the reliability of any inductive inference one 
should validate the underlying inductive premises by probing for all possible errors. 
Model should account with data regularities, obtaining a white noise error term, i.e. a 
random component without systematic contamination. Therefore, reliability of the 
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model is primary addressed by testing the assumptions using miss-specification tests. 
This criterion prevails against any index of predictive accuracy of the model (e.g. 
explained variance, classification error, AIC, ROC curve, etc.). Model should account 
with data regularities, obtaining a white noise error term, i.e. a random component 
without systematic contamination. Therefore, reliability of the model is primary 
addressed by testing the model assumptions using miss-specification tests.  Only if 
assumptions about the error term are met among disparate models, then model selection 
may be made using the best predictive accuracy. 
 
As we used logistic regression, this is a low-demanding method regarding 
assumptions (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). This technique assumes linearity in the 
logit and independence of errors. For studying the first assumption, we used graphical 
representation of the logit of the expected probabilities against each predictor, instead of 
statistical techniques such as the Box-Tidwell approach (see Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2007) because of the presence of zeros and the impossibility of computing the natural 
logarithm10
 
. For studying the second assumption, we used the Wald-Wolfowitz (WW) 
runs test applied to the sign of residuals (see Spanos, 2010).  
First of all, we ran a model considering only the 30 cases of success and the 18 
cases of worse performance. The aim was clearly analyse the influence of predictors on 
the probability of success. We considered as predictors 1X , 2X , 3X and 4X  In addition, as 
the number of cases was relatively low, we were able to compute the difference of home 
games played before and after the new coaches were signed. The procedure for getting 
                                                 
10 These graphical representations are available from authors upon request. All these exploratory analyses 
supported the linear hypothesis. 
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this difference was the computation of the expected number of home games for both 
partitions11 6X. We called this variable as . 
 
Results of the maximum likelihood estimation using STATA software are 
depicted in Table 6. As WW test yielded non-significant results, we provide three 
indexes of model performance, such as percentage of corrected classified cases, R-
square (the square of the correlation between the dependent variable and the model 
prediction) and the area under the ROC curve. We also show the parameter estimates 
and the marginal effects evaluated at the mean of each variable. Note that marginal 
effects are a measure of effect size, and provide information regarding the importance of 
each predictor. 
 
--- Table 6 about here --- 
 
Model 1 only misclassified three cases (93.83% of classification accuracy). As 
we hypothesized, both parameters associated to 3X  and 4X were negative, which 
indicated that to the extent that the winning percentage of a team increases, the 
probability of success decreases, and to the extent that the difference between the 
percentage of games played by a new coach and the percentage of games played by an 
old coach increases, then also decreases the probability of success. This latter fact 
indicates that firing a coach “as soon as possible” increases the probability of success. 
In addition, this variable yielded the stronger marginal effect. It is highly remarkable 
that 6X  yielded a negligible effect on the probability of success, which indicates that the 
                                                 
11 Some games were played in a neutral venue. This fact was taken into account in order to compute the 
expected number of home games played. 
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small discrepancies of the home games played by replaced and new coaches do not 
cause variation in the dependent variable. 
 
Both experience as coaches and former NBA players had a positive effect on the 
probability of success. Note that we ran several models using the three different 
indicators of experience as players 2X . The most simplistic indicators (category of 
player, and number of season played) performed equally well as the sophisticated index 
created from minutes played and winshares12
 
 (see Model 2). We decided to select the 
model containing the number of seasons variable (Model 1), because the player 
category would be more difficult to code for predictive analysis. Note that players 
become Hall of Fame members several years after they left the court, so a former player 
could pilot a NBA team before being considered member of this selected group of 
historical players. 
This first analysis served to support the selection of our independent variables 
and to identify factors discriminating between unsuccessful and successful decisions. 
Therefore, we think it is valuable for understanding factors affecting successful 
performance. However, the reality is somewhat different, because there is a great 
amount of replacements which have not been considered. Consequently, we were losing 
information (together with statistical power), with such small sample, and thus we 
considered in the subsequent analysis all of the 192 valid cases.  
 
Therefore, we tested a new model (Model 3), grouping as “unsuccessful 
performance” such cases where the performance was worse (18 cases) and neutral (144 
                                                 
12 Note that four cases were missing, because of the impossibility of obtaining full data about four of 
these players. 
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cases). Two reasons justified that decision: (1) although a new coach gets equal 
performance than a replaced coach, owners of teams lose money, because of a 
settlement they have to pay to the replaced coach and the money they have to pay to the 
new coach. Therefore, neutral effects in performance can also be considered as 
unsuccessful outcomes; (2) the small number of cases (18) of worse performance would 
not support the implementation of an ordered logistic regression, using three categories 
for the independent variable (worse, neutral, better). 
 
Results are also showed in Table 6. Note that we did not consider the variable 
6X  in the model. The negligible effect found in the first analysis and results of the 
simulation explained in the previous section support this decision. In addition, we chose 
the number of seasons played as NBA players as indicator of former player experience. 
Model correctly classifies 90.10% of the cases. This is not a very noticeable 
improvement to the naïve classifier (model without predictors), because it would obtain 
84.4%, although it is significantly higher13 3X. Again, both parameters associated to  
and 4X were negative, but this time marginal effect of 3X  was higher than the effect of 
4X . The experience of new coaches both as coaches and former players slightly 
influenced the probability of success. We may say that results were in line with those 
obtained in the first analysis, but with some differences; (1) the marginal effects of 1X  
and 2X decreased; (2) the strongest influence on the probability of success is made 
by 3X , not 4X . Therefore, the experience of coaches is almost irrelevant for increasing 
the probability of success. In addition, firing a coach in the early stages of the season 
increases the probability of success, but the effect is also small, because the highest 
                                                 
13 We ran a model with only an intercept, restricting all coefficients to zero, and yielded significant 
results, which indicated that predictors are relevant for explaining the dependent variable. 
 27 
effect is achieved by the winning percentage variable, i.e. to the extent that the winning 
percentage of a team increases, the probability of a new coach improves performance 
decreases. 
 
As we explained previously, we also explored the effect of 5X (experience of 
coaches in their whole career) in all the model tested, and no significant results were 
found. The inclusion of this variable did not improve the classification accuracy of the 
models. Therefore, and considering that this information is not available at the moment 
of signing a new coach, decision makers are not harmed by do not know it14
 
. 
Finally, and using Model 3 (the whole valid cases), we may deepen into the 
interpretation of the marginal effects, in order to provide specific examples of the effect 
of one variable on the probability of success, obviously, ceteris paribus. We evaluated 
marginal effects of each predictor at different values, and using the mean value as the 
reference point in the other predictors. A guide about how to achieve this procedure can 
be found in Wooldridge (2003). Table 7 shows some of these marginal effects. If teams 
hire a coach with a great level of experience (both as coach and as a former player), then 
probability of success increases in a non-linear form, but this probability decrease in a 
more powerful way if the winning percentage of the team increases. Therefore, hiring a 
coach with high degree of NBA experience increases the probability of success, but this 
effect is higher if the winning percentage of the team is low and if the change is 
produced if the new coach has (potentially) much more games to play than the coach he 
replaced. 
 
                                                 
14 We also tested several models using the number of minutes and winshares variable, but did not 
outperform the classification rate of Model 3. Other specifications, including quadratic and interaction 
effects were tested, but did not improve the original model. 
 28 
--- Table 7 about here --- 
 
 
Discussion, limitations and further research 
 
In this research we made a complete review of the mid-season changes of 
coaches occurred along the NBA history. We statistically compared the winning 
percentage of each team at the moment of change, with the winning percentage got by a 
new coach, in order to obtain a reliable test considering performance achieved in a 
sample of the whole games of a season. In addition we tested a model in order to 
explain the successes cases, i.e. when a new coach got statistically better results than the 
coach he replaced. 
 
Results show that changing a coach only improved performance in about 15% of 
cases, and decreased performance in about 10% of cases, being the neutral effect 
prevalent in the majority of cases (about 75%). This result indicates that NBA owners 
and general managers made bad decisions about 85% of times, because of the financial 
costs associated to the change. Although we have analysed if new hired coaches 
continued training in the subsequent season, we have not studied if results obtained in 
following seasons were the expected by owners. Therefore, our results are restricted to 
the short-term, i.e. performance within a season15
                                                 
15 Recall that we did not consider play-off games, just regular season games. A new coach could achieve 
a great performance in the play-off series, but we excluded these kind of games because we did not a 
similar series of games managed by replaced coaches. 
. Consequently, we acknowledge that 
these decisions might be successful in the long-term. Further research should explore 
this issue, in a similar way as Giambatista (2004) did. Nevertheless, it seems that 
owners followed a rational thinking with successful coaches, because more than 75% of 
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coaches who got better results continued the next season. In addition, as these changes 
of coaches are a disrupt in team stability, this result could partially support the findings 
of Montanari, Silvestre and Gallo (2008), who found that team stability and longevity of 
team relationships have a positive impact on performance. 
 
The probability of success (i.e. the probability of new coaches improves 
performance), increased with the experience of new coaches (defined by the number of 
games managed and the number of wins got till the moment of change), and also with 
the experience as former NBA players (defined by the number of seasons played), but it 
was inversely related to the winning percentage of teams, and the difference between 
games played by old and new coaches. 
 
Marginal effects indicated that the experience as a former NBA player had the 
smallest effect on the probability of success. Although Goodall, Kahn and Oswald 
(2010) found a strong predictor of coach success, we did not find such effect size. It is 
important to note that our definition of coach success is different from these authors, 
because we only restrict success to the improvement of winning percentage within one 
season. 
 
It seems clear that if owners want to improve the probability of success when 
they fire a coach, then they have to hire a new coach with high experience as NBA 
coach and as NBA player. However, these type of coaches use to be the best paid, so 
owners and general managers have to make a difficult decision, because of the trade-off 
between experience and salary. Note that hiring a coach with the highest NBA 
experience, only would increase the probability of success about 15% with respect to a 
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rookie coach, and hiring a coach with a great career as a player only would increase 
probability about 5% with respect to a coach without experience as a former NBA 
player. The difference between salaries of both types of coaches could be about $3-5 
millions, i.e. a very important difference. 
 
Changing a coach in the earlier period of the season helps to improve 
performance. Again the effect size is small. This indicates that when things go bad, it 
would be a wiser decision to fire a coach as soon as possible than to wait for playing 
more games, because there would not have time enough to re-drive the situation. 
However, the most important variable in the model is the winning percentage of teams 
at the moment of change. Worse teams are much more probably to get success than 
better teams. In fact, the mean of the winning percentage of teams who decreased 
performance was 0.38 against 0.21 for teams who improved results. Therefore, 
changing a coach for the better teams of the NBA within a season is a very risky 
decision, with very low probability of success. 
 
We recognize all these conclusions are highly dependent of the procedure we 
achieved to compare the performance of coaches. We based our reasoning in the finite 
population approach for comparing proportions. Note that this procedure requires the 
assumption of the number of games managed by coaches is a random sample of the 
hypothetical 82 games that they would play in the whole season. In addition, any 
sample realization, i.e. any result recorded should be independent from the remaining 
games. Obviously, this is not exactly the reality. Games played by coaches could be 
considered a pseudo-random sample of games. In fact, they are not previously 
determined before a season starts. Although schedule is known, it would be impossible 
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to a priori know how many games would play a fired coach and a hired coach, neither 
the moment of the season where change would make. Therefore, we believe the random 
sampling assumption is not severely problematic. Regarding independence, Arkes and 
Martínez (2010) found the existence of momentum in NBA, i.e. results of games 
partially depends on results of previous games, once controlled for several factors. It is 
true that marginal effect of momentum is small (about 3-4%), but this would indicate 
that the independence assumption would be violated. We think that, considering the 
small effect size of the momentum variable, our method is robust against this slight 
departure of independency of observations, but we acknowledge this fact as a limitation 
of our work. 
 
We also acknowledge that we based the statistical comparison of proportions in 
the classical normal approximation. However, other methods are available, such as 
bootstrap for finite populations (see Lombardía, González-Manteiga & Prada-Sánchez, 
2004, for a review). Finite sample distribution of the test statistic could be obtained by a 
parametric bootstrap, and might give different critical values from the normal 
approximation. Nevertheless, bootstrap techniques have also limitations, and results are 
dependent on several factors such as the number of replications, the size of the 
population and the sample, or the different forms of achieving the resampling 
procedure. One option for further research is to only consider cases when a triangulation 
of statistical procedures, (such as some bootstrapping methods and the binomial test), 
agree. However, probably this form of analysis would yield some inconsistent results 
and several cases should be deleted from the analysis. Anyway, we think that the 
simplicity of the procedure we used in this research is an advantage, because it allows 
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simple hand computation, making easier its use for practitioners. In addition, there is a 
strong theory behind this procedure that supports its feasibility. 
 
The finite population approach to test differences in proportions allows counting 
with an error which decreases to the extent that the sample approaches population. It is 
true that some authors (see Grissom & Kim, 2005) recommend some threshold values in 
the combination of n  and p  for applying the test that are not fully met in our data, but 
they do not consider the nature of a finite population, because this recommendation is 
made in a context of infinite population. We also acknowledge the approximate nature 
of the computed confidence intervals and the conservative characteristic of the binomial 
difference test using the normal approximation. In addition, other methodological 
approaches would be also feasible to apply, such as data envelopment analysis (e.g. 
Fizel & D’Itri, 1996; 1999; González-Gómez, Picazo-Tadeo & García-Rubio, 2011). 
However, acknowledging the merit of such sophisticated analysis, several caveats arise 
from the determination of the inputs. For example, González-Gómez, Picazo-Tadeo & 
García-Rubio, 2011 use team budgets as input as a proxy of quality of teams. However, 
as Berri and Schmidt (2010) found, in the NBA, teams pay-roll only explain about 6% 
of variance in wins. Therefore, it seems that is not a good measure of quality or strength 
of teams. In addition, as we considered the winning percentage at the moment of 
change, this variable is implicitly a proxy for measuring the quality of teams. 
 
An alternative form of interpreting the finite population approach would have 
been to compare the aggregated percentage of wins of new coaches (0.41) against the 
aggregated percentage of wins of coaches they replaced (0.37), i.e. to achieve an unique 
test of difference of proportions, instead of the 203 tests (192 valid cases) achieved. 
 33 
Therefore, and considering 15457 games as the total population of games, 7846 the 
number of games managed by new coaches, and 6596 the number of games managed by 
old coaches, then 95% confidence interval around the two proportions would be (0.403 ; 
0.418) and (0.366 ; 0.383), i.e. in an aggregated form, new coaches significantly 
improved the performance of their predecessors. This form of viewing the analysis 
would overcome the problem of the conservative individual tests, but obviously do not 
allow for individual analysis of the success of change. However, we think it provides 
useful information regarding the trend of the change effect. 
 
Nevertheless, a major limitation of our study arises for not controlling for mid-
season transactions. These types of transactions could improve (or decline) the quality 
of teams, and could be a source of systematic noise in our analysis. Although data on 
transactions were available at www.baskteball-reference.com, we think it would be 
highly complicated to analyse how these changes in rosters could influence results. 
Nevertheless, the most important changes in rosters are not usually achieved in mid-
season time, but when a season ends. Therefore, the possible bias in our results would 
be of lesser importance that the potential bias of studies considering longitudinal 
approaches (e.g. Giambatista, 2004), or analysing the seasons before and after the coach 
were changed (McTeer, White & Persad, 1995). One of the possible solutions would be 
considering player talent as a proxy for the quality of the roster, in a similar way as 
Fizel and D’itri (1999) did. However, how to measure talent of players is a controversial 
issue in basketball (see Berri & Bradbury, 2010; Berri & Schmidt, 2010;  Berri, Schmidt 
& Brook, 2006), and the form Fizel and D’itri (1999) addressed this question is very 
debatable. Consequently, it is a challenge for further research to try to count with this 
factor using the best measurement instrument. 
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In sum,  and acknowledging the commented limitations, our research has 
advanced in the understanding of the effect of hiring new coaches on performance of 
NBA teams, when change is achieved in the middle of the season. Changing a coach is 
an important managerial decision which does not guarantee improvement in the short 
term, i.e. in the same season. Only about 15% of new coaches outperformed in a 
significantly way their predecessors. In order to maximize the probability of success, 
highly experienced coaches, with a long career as former NBA players should be 
signed. In addition, change should be made before season advances. These three factors 
slightly contribute to increase the probability of success, being the most important 
variable the winning percentage of the team at the moment of change. Worse teams are 
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Appendix: Successful coaches 














Red Auberbach Yes Blackhawks  1949-50 0.14 7 0.49 57 -0.62 -0.08 
Jack Smiley Yes Waterloo Hawks 1949-50 0.23 35 0.41 27 -0.35 -0.01 
Clair Bee Yes Balltimore Bullets 1952-53 0.00 3 0.24 67 -0.26 -0.22 
Dave DeBusschere Yes Detroit Pistons 1964-65 0.18 11 0.42 69 -0.46 -0.01 
Red Holzman No New York Knicks 1967-68 0.41 37 0.62 45 -0.37 -0.06 
Phil Johnson Yes Kansas City Omaha Kings 1973-74 0.24 25 0.47 57 -0.39 -0.07 
Butch Van Breda  No New Orleans Jazz 1974-75 0.06 16 0.33 66 -0.39 -0.15 
Don Nelson Yes Milwaukee Bucks 1976-77 0.17 18 0.42 64 -0.42 -0.09 
Lenny Wilkens No Seattle Supersonics 1977-78 0.23 22 0.70 60 -0.64 -0.31 
Dave Cowens Yes Boston Celtics 1978-79 0.14 14 0.40 68 -0.43 -0.07 
Phil Johnson No Kansas City Kings 1984-85 0.11 9 0.41 73 -0.51 -0.09 
Wes Unseld Yes Washington Bullets 1987-88 0.30 27 0.55 55 -0.41 -0.09 
George Irvine No Indiana Pacers 1988-89 0.00 9 0.30 20 -0.48 -0.12 
Dick Versace Yes Indiana Pacers 1988-89 0.21 29 0.42 53 -0.35 -0.06 
Bob Hill No Indiana Pacers 1990-91 0.36 25 0.56 57 -0.38 -0.03 
Larry Brown No L. A. Clippers 1991-92 0.47 47 0.66 35 -0.34 -0.04 
Gar Heard Yes Dallas Mavericks 1992-93 0.07 29 0.17 53 -0.20 0.00 
Bernie Bickerstaff No Denver Nuggets 1994-95 0.42 50 0.63 32 -0.36 -0.05 
Danny Ainge Yes Phoenix 1996-97 0.00 8 0.54 74 -0.58 -0.50 
Bernie Bickerstaff No Washington Bullets 1996-97 0.47 47 0.63 35 -0.32 -0.01 
Don Casey No New Jersey Nets 1998-99 0.15 20 0.43 30 -0.45 -0.11 
Paul Silas No Charlotte Hornets 1998-99 0.27 15 0.63 35 -0.58 -0.15 
Bill Cartwright Yes Chicago Bulls 2001-02 0.15 27 0.31 55 -0.29 -0.03 
Hubie Brown No Memphis Grizzlies 2002-03 0.00 8 0.38 74 -0.41 -0.34 
Johnny Davis No Orlando Magic 2003-04 0.09 11 0.28 71 -0.36 -0.02 
Mike Fratello No Memphis Grizzlies 2004-05 0.31 16 0.61 66 -0.51 -0.08 
Avery Johnson Yes Dallas Mavericks 2004-05 0.66 64 0.89 18 -0.38 -0.09 
George Karl No Denver Nuggets 2004-05 0.40 42 0.80 40 -0.53 -0.26 
Scott Brooks Yes Ocklahoma City 2008-09 0.08 13 0.32 69 -0.39 -0.10 
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Table 1. Changes of coaches by season 
















1949-50 17 66 4 561 8.8 1980-81 23 82 4 943 5.2 
1950-51 11 64 4 354 13.9 1981-82 23 82 7 943 9.1 
1951-52 10 66 1 330 3.7 1982-83 23 82 1 943 1.3 
1952-53 10 70 1 351 3.5 1983-84 23 82 1 943 1.3 
1953-54 9 72 1 324 3.8 1984-85 23 82 2 943 2.6 
1954-55 9 72 0 288 0.0 1985-86 23 82 2 943 2.6 
1955-56 8 72 1 288 4.3 1986-87 23 82 3 943 3.9 
1956-57 8 72 3 288 12.8 1987-88 23 82 6 943 7.8 
1957-58 8 72 2 288 8.5 1988-89 25 82 6 1025 7.2 
1958-59 8 72 2 288 8.5 1989-90 27 82 3 1107 3.3 
1959-60 8 75 3 300 12.3 1990-91 27 82 2 1107 2.2 
1960-61 8 79 0 316 0.0 1991-92 27 82 8 1107 8.9 
1961-62 9 80 3 360 10.3 1992-93 27 82 5 1107 5.6 
1962-63 9 80 1 360 3.4 1993-94 27 82 2 1107 2.2 
1963-64 9 80 0 360 0.0 1994-95 27 82 4 1107 4.4 
1964-65 9 80 3 360 10.3 1995-96 29 82 3 1189 3.1 
1965-66 9 80 1 360 3.4 1996-97 29 82 8 1189 8.3 
1966-67 10 81 3 405 9.1 1997-98 29 82 3 1189 3.1 
1967-68 12 82 1 492 2.5 1998-99 29 50 5 725 8.5 
1968-69 14 82 1 574 2.1 1999-00 29 82 6 1189 6.2 
1969-70 14 82 3 574 6.4 2000-01 29 82 2 1189 2.1 
1970-71 17 82 0 697 0.0 2001-02 29 82 6 1189 6.2 
1971-72 17 82 4 697 7.1 2002-03 29 82 4 1189 4.1 
1972-73 17 82 5 697 8.8 2003-04 29 82 9 1189 9.3 
1973-74 17 82 2 697 3.5 2004-05 30 82 10 1230 10.0 
1974-75 18 82 2 738 3.3 2005-06 30 82 3 1230 3.0 
1975-76 18 82 2 738 3.3 2006-07 30 82 3 1230 3.0 
1976-77 22 82 4 902 5.5 2007-08 30 82 2 1230 2.0 
1977-78 22 82 5 902 6.8 2008-09 30 82 9 1230 9.0 
1978-79 22 82 4 902 5.5 2009-10 30 82 4 1230 4.0 
1979-80 22 82 4 902 5.5 Total   203 48521  
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Table 2. Coaches signed  
1 time Alvin Gentry, Bob Bass, Bob Hill, Bob Mackinnon, Gene Littles, Lionel Hollins, Phil 
Johnson, Red Holzman, Richie Adubato 
 
2 times Alex Hannun, Bernie Bickerstaff, Bill Bertka, Bob Kloppenburg, Bob Pettit, Dick McGuire, 
Dick Motta, Don Casey, Don Chaney, Don Nelson, Elgin Baylor, Frank Hamblen, George 
Irvine, George Karl, Herb Williams, Jerry Colangelo, Jerry Reynolds, Johnny Davis, Kevin 
Loughery, Kevin McHale, Lenny Wilkens, Mike Fratello, Pat Riley, Paul Seymour, Pete 
Myers, Rex Hughes, Scott Skiles 
 
3 times Al Attles, Andrew Levane, Avery Johnson, Bill Berry, Bill Blair, Bill Carwright, Bill 
Musselman, Billy Cunningham, Bob Kauffman, Bob Lanier, Bob Staak, Brendan Malone, 
Brian Winters, Bucky Buckwalter, Buddy Jeannette, Bumper Hormohlen, Butch Carter, 
Butch Van Breda Kolff, Carl Braun, Chick Reiser, Chris Ford, Chris Jent, Chuck Dayly, 
Clair Bee, Cotton Fitzsimmons, Danny Ainge, Darrel Walker, Dave Cowens, Dave 
DeBusschere, Dennis Johnson, Dick Van Arsdale, Dick Versace, Don Delaney, Donnie 
Butcher, Donnie Walsh, Doug Moe, Doxie Moore, Draff Young, Earl Lloyd, Ed Gregory, Ed 
MaCauley, Ed Tapscott, Eddie Jordan, Flip Sanders, Frank Johnson, Frank Layden, Fred 
Carter, Gar Heard, Garry St. Jean, Gene Sue, Gregg Popovich, Harry Gallatin, Herb Brown, 
Hubie Brown, Ike Duffey, Jack Smiley, Jay Triano, Jeff Bower, Jeff Van Gundy, Jerry 
Sloan, Jim Boylan, Jim Brovelli, Jim Lynam, Jim O'Brien, Jim Pollard, Jim Todd, Joe 
Mullaney, John Carrol, John Kundla, John Logan, John Lucas, John MacLeod, Johnny Egan, 
Johnny McCarthy, Jonny Bach, Keith Smart, Kenny Natt, Kevin Pritchard, Kiki 
Vandeweghe, Kim Hughes, Kurt Rambis, Larry Brown, Larry Krystkowiak, Larry 
Staverman, Lawrence Frank, Mack Calvin, Magic Johnson, Mel Daniels, Michael Cooper, 
Mike D'Antoni, Mike Evans, Mike Todorovich, Nate McMillan, Paul Silas, Paul Westhead, 
Randy Wittman, Ray Scott, Red Auberbach, Red Rocha, Richie Guerin, Rick Adelman, Rod 
Thorn, Rudy Tomjanovich, Scott Brooks, Scotty Robertson, Sidney Lowe, Slater Martin, 
Slick Leonard, Stu Inman, Stu Jackson, Terry Dischinger, Terry Scotts, Tom Barrise, Tom 
Marshall, Tom Sanders, Tony Barone, Tony DiLeo, Vince Boryla, Wally Jones, Walt 




Table 3. Performance comparison between new and replaced coaches.  
 Number % % (valid cases) 
Neutral effect 144 70.93 75.00 
Worse performance 18 8.86 9.37 
Better performance 30 14.77 15.62 
No valid* 11 5.41  
*No valid are the cases when the old or the new coach played only one game, so statistical test was not 
feasible. 
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Table 4. Continuity of coaches 
  Worse performance Better performance 
Continued next season 96 (47.29%) 2 (11.11%) 23 (76.67%) 
Did not continue next season 72 (35.46%) 8 (44.44%) 6 (20.00%) 
Fired the same season 35 (17.24%) 8 (44.44%) 1 (3.33%) 
Total 203 (192 valid cases) 18 30 
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Table 5. Simulation of the estimate of the percentage of successful coaches in the following years 
 Population Sample 95% CI 
Current study 203 203 0.148 
5 next years projection 220 203 (0.134 ; 0.162) 
10 next years projection 236 203 (0.130 ; 0.166) 
50 next years projection 369 203 (0.115 ; 0.181) 
Extremely large projection 2000 203 (0.102; 0.194) 
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Table 6. Results of the models estimation 
 Model 1 Marg. effects Model 2 
Marg. 




accuracy 93.75%  95.45%  90.10%  
R-square (95% CI) 0.760 (0.56 ; 0.84)  
0.829 
(0.67 ; 0.89)  
0.342 
(0.22 ; 0.44)  
Area under the ROC 
curve 0.965  0.968  0.842  
WW test 0.16  -0.19  0.38  
Constant 0.213  -0.598  0.001  
1X  2.472 0.271 2.760* 0.337 0.747 0.056 
2X  0.121 0.013 1.762 0.215 0.059 0.004 
3X  -3.862 -0.424 -3.23 -0.39 -8.924 -0.673 
4X  -6.767* -0.744* -7.692* -0.94 -1.002 -0.075 
5X        
6X  0.030 0.003 0.019 0.002   
*p<0.05 
Note: To compute confidence intervals around R-square, the R2 program (Steiger & Fouladi, 1992) was 
used  
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Table 7. Some marginal effects 
Predictor Change in the value of predictor Change in the probability of success 
1X  From 0 to 1 5.9% 
 From 1 to 2 10.4% 
2X  From 0 to 3 1.9% 
 From 5 to 12 3.6% 
3X  From 0.1 to 0.25 -27.7% 
 From 0.25 to 0.5 -15.8% 
4X  From –0.25 to 0 -1.9% 
 From 0 to 0.5 -7.6% 
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Note: There are 121 cases in zero. 
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